The California Supreme Court has rejected the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board’s practice of extending its own deadline to act on petitions for reconsideration because of internal administrative delays. In a unanimous decision, Mayor v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board confirms that the statutory 60-day deadline is mandatory and cannot be extended through the Board’s application of equitable tolling.

For employers, carriers, claims administrators, and defense counsel, the decision underscores the need to monitor reconsideration proceedings and preserve appellate deadlines independently of assurances that the WCAB will eventually address a petition.

The Dispute

A workers’ compensation judge awarded Joseph Mayor permanent total disability benefits following an industrial injury. His employer, Ross Valley Sanitation District, timely filed a petition for reconsideration on March 23, 2023.

Under the version of Labor Code section 5909 applicable to that petition, reconsideration was deemed denied unless the WCAB acted within 60 days of filing. The WCAB did not grant reconsideration until 144 days after filing. It attributed the delay to an administrative irregularity and relied on Shipley v. WCAB (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1104 to treat its action as timely based on when it received notice of the petition.

Mayor sought extraordinary writ relief to enforce the statutory deadline. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s judgment granting that relief.

The Holding: A Mandatory Deadline the Board Cannot Extend Itself

The Supreme Court explained that equitable tolling generally permits litigants to pursue claims beyond an otherwise applicable limitations period when appropriate equitable circumstances exist. It does not authorize the WCAB to extend its own deadline to act.

Allowing the Board to restart the clock because of its internal processing failures would undermine both finality and the statutory timetable for seeking appellate review. Under the former statute governing Mayor’s case, failure to act within 60 days of filing resulted in denial by operation of law, followed by a 45-day period to petition for writ of review.

The Court nevertheless drew an important distinction: section 5909 does not limit the WCAB’s fundamental jurisdiction. However, the WCAB lacked authority to toll its own deadline to act. Counsel should therefore avoid describing every untimely order as automatically void for lack of fundamental jurisdiction. (Opinion, pp. 11–18.)

Due Process Remains a Narrow, Case-Specific Question

The Court left open whether particular circumstances could support relief on due-process grounds. It emphasized that the affected petitioner must assert those rights; the Board cannot invoke them as a routine justification for extending its own deadline.

The Court also disapproved Shipley to the extent it suggests every party necessarily has a due-process right to Board review after the statutory deadline. Timely filing and expiration of the deadline, standing alone, do not establish a due-process violation. (Opinion, pp. 24–29.)

Practice Takeaways

Track the correct statutory trigger. Mayor’s petition was governed by the former filing-date rule. The amended section 5909 starts the 60-day period when the trial judge transmits the case to the WCAB and requires notice to the parties.  Counsel must identify the applicable statutory version and document the relevant trigger date. (Opinion, pp. 5–6, 33.)

Calendar the writ deadline independently. When a petition is deemed denied, Labor Code section 5950 generally provides 45 days to seek writ review. Do not wait for a separate denial order or assume an internal processing delay suspends that deadline. If transmission or notice is unclear, promptly investigate and assess how to preserve appellate rights.

Follow up promptly and preserve the record. Retain filing confirmations, proofs of service, transmission notices, the WCJ’s report, and communications concerning processing delays. Early follow-up supports deadline management and may be important to a fact-specific request for relief. An inquiry alone should not be treated as extending a statutory deadline.

Distinguish a late grant from a timely grant for study. The Supreme Court expressly declined to decide whether the grant-for-study practice is proper or whether a final merits decision must issue within the 60-day period. A timely grant followed by a lengthy delay therefore raises a separate question that Mayor does not resolve. (Opinion, p. 12, fn. 4.)

Assess extraordinary relief when the opposing party receives a late grant. The Court approved extraordinary writ relief to enforce section 5909 rather than requiring Mayor to wait indefinitely for a final decision. It observed that prohibition would have been the more appropriate writ vehicle. Counsel should evaluate the procedural route and timing for challenging an untimely grant instead of assuming the issue must await a merits decision. (Opinion, pp. 30–33 & fn. 9.)

Mayor makes active deadline management essential: a timely reconsideration filing must be followed by monitoring of the Board’s statutory action period and a plan to preserve judicial review if that period expires.